"Don, doff, discard" to "don, doff, decontaminate" FFR and mask integrity and inactivation of a SARS-CoV-2 surrogate and a norovirus following multiple vaporised hydrogen peroxide-, ultraviolet germicidal irradiation-, and dry heat decontamination by Ludwig-Begall, Louisa et al.
 1 
FULL TITLE 1 
“Don, doff, discard” to “don, doff, decontaminate” – FFR and mask integrity and inactivation of a 2 
SARS-CoV-2 surrogate and a norovirus following multiple vaporised hydrogen peroxide-, ultraviolet 3 
germicidal irradiation-, and dry heat decontaminations 4 
 5 
SHORT TITLE 6 
Mask and respirator integrity and viral inactivation after multiple-cycle decontamination 7 
 8 
AUTHORS 9 
Louisa F. Ludwig-Begall1¶,, Constance Wielick1¶,, Olivier Jolois2, Lorène Dams1, Ravo M. 10 
Razafimahefa1, Hans Nauwynck3, Pierre-Francois Demeuldre4, Aurore Napp4, Jan Laperre2, Etienne 11 
Thiry1* and Eric Haubruge5  12 
 13 
AUTHOR AFFILIATIONS 14 
1Veterinary Virology and Animal Viral Diseases, Department of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases, 15 
FARAH Research Centre, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Liège University, Liège, Belgium 16 
2Centexbel Textile Research Centre, Grace-Hollogne, Belgium 17 
3Laboratory of Virology, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Ghent University, Merelbeke, Belgium 18 
4Department of Hospital Pharmacy, The University Hospital Center, Liège University, Liège, Belgium 19 
5 TERRA Research Centre, Gembloux Agro-Bio Tech, Liège University, Gembloux, Belgium 20 
¶These authors contributed equally to this work. 21 
*Corresponding author: etienne.thiry@uliege.be 22 
Orcid ID Etienne Thiry: 0000-0002-9585-7933 23 
WORD COUNT: 5719 24 
Non-standard abbreviations:  FFR: filtering facepiece respirator; SM: surgical mask; SARS-CoV-2: 25 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; PRCV: porcine respiratory coronavirus; MuNoV: 26 
murine norovirus; UVGI; ultraviolet germicidal irradiation; VHP: vaporised hydrogen peroxide; DH: 27 
dry heat; BFE: bacterial filtration efficiency 28 
  2 
ABSTRACT 29 
Background 30 
As the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic accelerates, the supply of personal protective equipment remains under 31 
strain. To combat shortages, re-use of surgical masks and filtering facepiece respirators has been 32 
recommended. Prior decontamination is paramount to the re-use of these typically single-use only items 33 
and, without compromising their integrity, must guarantee inactivation of SARS-CoV-2 and other 34 
contaminating pathogens. 35 
 36 
Aim 37 
We provide information on the effect of time-dependent passive decontamination (infectivity loss over 38 
time during room temperature storage in a breathable bag) and evaluate inactivation of a SARS-CoV-2 39 
surrogate and a non-enveloped model virus as well as mask and respirator integrity following active 40 
multiple-cycle vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI), and dry 41 
heat (DH) decontamination.  42 
 43 
Methods 44 
Masks and respirators, inoculated with infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus or murine norovirus, 45 
were submitted to passive decontamination or single or multiple active decontamination cycles; viruses 46 
were recovered from sample materials and viral titres were measured via TCID50 assay.  In parallel, 47 
filtration efficiency tests and breathability tests were performed according to EN standard 14683 and 48 
NIOSH regulations.  49 
 50 
Results and Discussion 51 
Infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus and murine norovirus remained detectable on masks and 52 
respirators up to five and seven days of passive decontamination. Single and multiple cycles of VHP-, 53 
UVGI-, and DH were shown to not adversely affect bacterial filtration efficiency of masks. Single- and 54 
multiple UVGI did not adversely affect respirator filtration efficiency, while VHP and DH induced a 55 
decrease in filtration efficiency after one or three decontamination cycles. Multiple cycles of VHP-, 56 
UVGI-, and DH slightly decreased airflow resistance of masks but did not adversely affect respirator 57 
breathability. VHP and UVGI efficiently inactivated both viruses after five, DH after three, 58 
decontamination cycles, permitting demonstration of a loss of infectivity by more than three orders of 59 
magnitude. This multi-disciplinal approach provides important information on how often a given PPE 60 
item may be safely reused. 61 
 62 
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INTRODUCTION 63 
As the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic accelerates, the 64 
supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) remains under severe strain. In particular, the surging 65 
global demand for disposable surgical face masks (SMs) and filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs), 66 
identified as incremental for source control and prevention of onward transmission from infected 67 
individuals (SMs) and protection of health-care personnel during aerosol-generating procedures and 68 
support treatments (FFRs) [1–4], by far exceeds current manufacturing capacities.  69 
 70 
To combat critical shortages, and in a departure from the prevailing culture of throwaway living [5] and 71 
a shift towards an eco-efficient circular economy within the healthcare industry [6], repeated re-use of 72 
typically single-use only items has been recommended [1,2,7,8]. Prior decontamination is paramount to 73 
safe PPE re-use; SM and FFR reprocessing techniques must guarantee not only the complete inactivation 74 
of SARS-CoV-2 and other contaminating respiratory or oral human pathogens (the US Food and Drug 75 
Administration recommends a robust proof of infectious bioburden reduction of three orders of 76 
magnitude for viral pathogens [9]), but must do so without compromising the integrity of the items 77 
themselves.   78 
 79 
In the context of a limited re-use strategy, CDC-issued reccommendations include storage of SMs or 80 
FFRs at room temperature (in a breathable paper bag) for a minimum period of five days of passive 81 
decontamination prior to re-use [10]. However, SARS-CoV-2 room temperature survival rates have 82 
been subject to much debate, with earlier reports of an only short persistence (three or four days on 83 
porous and non-porous surfaces, respectively [11,12]) succeeded by more recent ones of significantly 84 
longer viability (21 days on PPE [13] and up to 28 days on various common surfaces [14]). While 85 
reported differences are likely dependent on multiple variables, including fluctuations in ambient 86 
temperature, relative humidity, light influx, and virus input, they certainly also reflect differences in the 87 
surfaces or carrier matrices themselves [15], necessitating targeted assays to evaluate and mitigate the 88 
individual risk of transmission via fomites in general and SMs or FFRs in particular.  89 
 90 
Various studies have investigated active SM or FFR decontamination with regard to either biocidal 91 
efficacy (modelled utilising a wide range of organisms and matrices) [12,16] or the impact of repeat 92 
cycles on functional performance of SMs or FFRs [8,17–20]. Few studies, however, offer a consolidated 93 
data set examining both viral inactivation as well as SM and FFR integrity subsequent to multiple-cycle 94 
decontamination [21]. Current recommendations governing SM and FFR re-use are thus based on 95 
extrapolations from various sources describing assays performed under vastly differing experimental 96 
conditions and necessarily include not inconsiderable degrees of uncertainty [22–24].   97 
 98 
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Amongst the various SM or FFR reprocessing techniques under investigation, vaporised hydrogen 99 
peroxide (VHP), an industry standard chemical decontaminant implemented in medical-, 100 
pharmaceutical-, and research facilities, has garnered attention as a cost-effective and practical option 101 
for SM and FFR decontamination [8,9,17,21,22,25].  Two physical decontamination methods, 102 
ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) [18,19] and the application of dry heat (DH) [12,18], have 103 
further shown promise as SM or FFR reprocessing techniques.  104 
 105 
We previously demonstrated efficient single-cycle VHP, UVGI, and DH decontamination of SMs and 106 
FFRs inoculated with two in vitro cultivable BSL2 pathogens. Inactivation of the infectious SARS-CoV-107 
2 surrogate porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) [26–30] demonstrated virucidal activity of all three 108 
methods against enveloped coronaviruses [31];  decontamination of hardier non-enveloped human 109 
respiratory or oral pathogens, which can equally contaminate SMs or FFRs [9,32], was investigated 110 
using the notoriously tenacious murine norovirus model (MuNoV) [33–36].  111 
 112 
Here we verify PRCV and MuNoV survivability rates on SMs and FFRs and investigate multiple-cycle 113 
active decontamination of coronavirus- or norovirus-inoculated SMs and FFRs, demonstrating that 114 
VHP, UVGI, and DH efficiently inactivate both viruses after several rounds of decontamination, all 115 
three methods inducing a loss of viral infectivity by more than three orders of magnitude in line with 116 
the FDA guidelines [9]. In addition, an investigation into filtration efficiency and breathability of treated 117 
face coverings demonstrated that the cumulative use of UVGI, VHP, or DH did not adversely affect SM 118 
integrity following up to five decontamination cycles. Similarly, FFRs retained their integrity 119 
subsequent to five iterations of UVGI or VHP treatment; DH, however, was found to significantly alter 120 
the characteristics of FFRs when exceeding three decontamination rounds. Our multi-disciplinal, 121 
consolidated approach, wherein both virus inactivation and SM and FFR integrity are investigated 122 
subsequent to multiple decontamination cycles, provides important information on how often a given 123 
PPE item may be safely reused. This data provides a measure of security to health-care personnel and 124 
the general public; it can help close the currently existing gap between PPE supply and demand and can 125 
contribute to the development of circular economy policies in a post-Covid-19 era healthcare sector.     126 
 127 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 128 
 129 
An overview of the workflow summarising the SM or FFR decontamination techniques, the number of 130 
applied cycles, and the tests to evaluate PPE integrity or virus inactivation, is provided in Figure 1.  131 
 132 
--- 133 
Figure 1. Experimental set-up of filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) and surgical mask (SM) 134 
decontamination assays. (A) Natural virus degradation over time. (B) Integrity testing after multiple-135 
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cycle vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI), and dry heat (DH) 136 
decontamination. (C) Multiple-cycle decontamination of porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV)- and 137 
murine norovirus (MuNoV)- inoculated SMs/FFRs. 138 
--- 139 
 140 
Surgical masks and filtering facepiece respirators 141 
All FFRs and SMs were verified to be from the same respective manufacturing lot. Manufacturers (and 142 
models): KN95 FFR - Guangzhou Sunjoy Auto Supplies CO. LTD, Guangdong, China (2020 143 
N°26202002240270); surgical mask (Type II) - Hangzhou Sunten Textile Co., LTD, Hangzhou, China 144 
(SuninCare™, Protect Plus).  145 
 146 
Decontamination techniques 147 
Vaporised hydrogen peroxide 148 
Vaporised hydrogen peroxide decontamination of masks and FFRs was performed using the low-149 
temperature and low-pressure V-PRO maX Sterilization System (STERIS, Mentor, OH) which uses 150 
59% liquid hydrogen peroxide to generate vapor and is intended for use in the sterilisation of heat- and 151 
moisture-sensitive metal and non-metal medical devices [37]. Surgical masks, FFRs, and a chemical 152 
indicator were placed in individual Mylar/Tyvek pouches within the sterilization chamber together with 153 
a biological indicator (Geobacillus stearothermophilus). Vaporous hydrogen peroxide treatment was 154 
then performed following a three-stage 28-minute non lumen cycle consisting of conditioning (5 g/min), 155 
decontamination (2.2 g/min; 19 min 47 sec) and aeration (7 min, 46 sec). During the decontamination 156 
stage, VHP was injected in four separate sterilisation pulses and was removed from the chamber through 157 
a catalytic converter. After each cycle, packaged masks were cooled to room temperature. STERIS has 158 
shown devices to be sterile at the normal sterilant concentration of 8.6 mg/L VHP as well as at a lower 159 
concentration of 6.0 mg/L VHP following cycling. Equipment and medical devices reprocessed in V-160 
PRO maX are considered ready for immediate use, with toxic VHP residue levels having been shown 161 
to be well below established residue limits by STERIS (greater than 9 to 800 fold lower than the 162 
allowable residue limit for internal tissue contact established in accordance with ISO 10993-17); off-163 
gassing was therefore not further evaluated in our study. 164 
 165 
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation 166 
Surgical masks and FFRs were individually irradiated using a LS-AT-M1 (LASEA Company, Sart 167 
Tilman, Belgium) equipped with 4 UV-C lamps of 5.5W (@UV-C). Hung vertically on a metal frame, 168 
masks and FFRs were inserted into a safety enclosure.  A 2 min UV-C treatment (surgical masks) led to 169 
a fluence of 2.6J/cm² per mask (1.3J/cm² per side). Power and irradiation time (120 s) were monitored 170 
and recorded throughout. Following irradiation, surgical masks and FFRs were unloaded and placed in 171 
individual bags. 172 
  6 
 173 
Dry heat 174 
Surgical masks and FFRs hung horizontally on a metal frame were inserted into an electrically heated 175 
vessel (M-Steryl, AMB Ecosteryl Company, Mons, Belgium) for 60 min (± 15 min) of heat treatment 176 
at 102°C (± 4°C) following the “Guidance for the reprocessing of SMs and FFRs during the coronavirus 177 
disease (COVID-19) Public Health Emergency” by the Belgian Federal Agency for Medicines and 178 
Health Products. Temperatures inside the heated vessel were recorded throughout to ensure correct 179 
exposure conditions. After termination of the treatment cycle, masks and FFRs were allowed to cool 180 
and then bagged individually.  181 
 182 
Surgical mask integrity testing  183 
Integrity of decontaminated SMs was determined via initial macroscopic observation followed by EN 184 
14683 standard filtration efficiency and breathability tests. Three SMs were used to analyse bacterial 185 
filtration efficiency (BFE), five to measure breathability. 186 
 187 
SMs - Macroscopic observation  188 
All SM performance testing was carried out at the Centexbel Textile Research Centre (Belgium). An 189 
initial visual inspection of SMs was carried out to verify their integrity; particular attention was paid to 190 
potential signs of degradation such as discoloration or deformation.  191 
 192 
 SMs - Bacterial filtration efficiency 193 
BFE employs a ratio of upstream bacterial challenge to downstream residual concentration to determine 194 
filtration efficiency of SM materials against droplets. It is a required quantitative test method for SM 195 
clearance by the United States FDA and the European Medical Device Directive 93/42/EEC (BFE ≥ 196 
98% according to EN 14683 for Type II and ASTM F2100 for Level 2 SMs). Briefly, SMs were 197 
conditioned at 85 ± 5 % relative humidity and 21 ± 5 °C prior to testing. BFE was measured using 198 
unneutralized Staphylococcus aureus bacteria contained within an aerosol droplet with a mean particle 199 
size of 3 µm diameter and a standard deviation of 2.9 µm. The aerosol sample was drawn through an 200 
unfolded SM clamped to the top of a 6-stage Andersen impactor with agar plates for collection of the 201 
bacteria particles at a flow rate of 28.3 L/min for 1 min as per FDA guidance and ASTM F2101 method 202 
(challenge level of 1500 and 3000 colony-forming units (CFU) per test). Following removal and 203 
incubation of the culture plates, colonies were counted to determine total CFU and BFE. A positive 204 
control without a test filter sample clamped into the system was used to determine the number of viable 205 
particles used per test. A negative control with no bacteria in the airstream was performed to determine 206 
the background challenge in the glass aerosol chamber prior to testing. 207 
 208 
SMs - Breathability 209 
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Breathability of SMs, defined as the measure of differential pressure required  to  draw  air  through  a  210 
measured  surface  area  at  a  constant  air  flow  rate, was measured according to EN 14683 + AC:2019 211 
(breathability < 40 Pa/cm2 for Type I and II; < 60 Pa/cm2 for Type IIR) [38]. Briefly, a constant airflow 212 
of 8 L/min was applied through a 25 mm diameter holder (4.9 cm2 total surface area at orifice) to a SM 213 
test specimen. A mass flow controller was used to measure the flow rate and the the air exchange 214 
pressure of the SM material was measured using two manometers positioned upstream and downstream 215 
of the airflow. Measurements were performed on five SMs and five different locations per unfolded 216 
mask (top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right, and middle). The differential pressure per mask, 217 
expressed in Pa/cm2 and obtained by dividing pressure difference by surface area, was reported as the 218 
average of all twenty-five measurements (5 measurements per mask; 5 masks tested). 219 
 220 
Filtering facepiece respirator integrity testing 221 
In the field of protective equipment, the nomenclature and standardisation pertaining to FFRs and their 222 
accreditation differ from one continent to another and even from one country to another. FFRs are 223 
generally referred to as FFP masks in Europe, KN95s in China, and N95s in the United States; the EN 224 
149 + A1:2009 standard (primarily) and an ISO 16900 standard (to a lesser extent) are applied in Europe, 225 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) procedures are invoked in the United 226 
States. While the different methods do not always have the same standardisation limits, the utilised 227 
techniques are generally the same. In the present study, filtration efficiency and breathability tests of 228 
FFR materials were performed following NIOSH procedures. Three FFRs were used per test condition 229 
(assays performed in triplicate). 230 
 231 
FFRs - Macroscopic observation 232 
All FFR performance testing was carried out at the Nelson Laboratories (USA). An initial visual 233 
inspection of FFRs was carried out to verify their integrity; particular attention was paid to potential 234 
signs of degradation such as discoloration or deformation.  235 
 236 
 FFRs - NaCl filtration efficiency 237 
Filtration efficiency of FFR materials was measured using the NIOSH sodium chloride (NaCl) aerosol 238 
method employed for certification of particulate respirators with an efficiency of ≥95% (42 CFR Part 239 
84). Briefly, FFRs were pre-conditioned at 85 ± 5% relative humidity and 38 ± 2.5°C for 25 ± 1 hr prior 240 
to measurements. A NaCl solution was aerosolized (by atomising an aqueous solution of the salt and 241 
evaporating the water) to a mean particle diameter of 0.075 µm with a standard deviation < 1.86 µm, 242 
charge neutralized, and then passed through the convex side of the FFRs. The concentrations of NaCl 243 
aerosol upstream and downstream of the FFR were measured at 85 L/min flow rate using a flame 244 
photometer, allowing for precise determinations in the range < 0.001 % to 100 % filter penetration. 245 
 246 
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 FFRs - Breathability 247 
FFR breathability was assessed using inhalation and exhalation breathing resistance measurements 248 
according to NIOSH 42CFR Part 84. Inhalation and exhalation resistance was tested according to 249 
NIOSH Standard Test Procedures (TEB-APR-STP-0007 and TEB-APR-STP-0003 [39]); results in mm 250 
H2O were recorded and evaluated against NIOSH performance criteria for FFR approvals (35 mm H2O 251 
for inhalation and 25 mm H2O for exhalation) at approximately 85 ± 2 L/min airflow. 252 
 253 
Virus inactivation testing 254 
Virus infectivity losses at room temperature (passive decontamination) as well as the efficacy of VHP, 255 
UVGI, and DH in inactivating infectious PRCV or MuNoV after multiple SM or FFR decontamination 256 
cycles (active decontamination) were assessed using experimentally inoculated SMs and FFRs.   257 
 258 
Viruses and cells 259 
The continuous swine testicle (ST) cell-line, grown from testicular foetal swine tissues as described by 260 
McClurkin and Norman (1966) [40], was maintained in  MEM (GIBCO), supplemented with 5% foetal 261 
calf serum (FCS) (Sigma), 1% sodium pyruvate 100x (GIBCO), and antibiotics (100U/ml penicillin, 262 
0.1mg/ml streptomycin and 0.05 mg/ml gentamycin).  263 
 264 
PRCV strain 91V44 [41] was passaged three times on confluent ST monolayers. Titres were determined 265 
via the tissue culture infective dose (TCID50) method; ST cells were seeded in 96-well plates and infected 266 
with 10-fold serial dilutions of PRCV and incubated for four days at 37 °C with 5% CO2. Four days 267 
after inoculation, monolayers were analysed for the presence of cytopathic effect by light microscopy. 268 
Titres, expressed as TCID50/ml, were calculated according to the Reed and Muench transformation [42]. 269 
PRCV stocks with a titre range of 2.00×107 to 2.00×108 TCID50/mL were used in subsequent steps. 270 
 271 
The murine macrophage cell line RAW264.7 (ATCC TIB-71) was maintained in Dulbecco’s modified 272 
Eagle’s medium (Invitrogen) containing 10% FCS (BioWhittaker), 1% 1 M HEPES buffer (pH 7.6) 273 
(Invitrogen), and 2% of an association of penicillin (5000 SI units/ml) and streptomycin (5 mg/ml) (PS, 274 
Invitrogen)  at 37 °C with 5% CO2.  275 
 276 
Stocks of MuNoV isolate MNV-1.CW1 were produced by infection of RAW264.7 cells at a multiplicity 277 
of infection of 0.05. Two days post-infection, cells and supernatant were harvested and clarified by 278 
centrifugation for 10 minutes at 4000 x g after three freeze/thaw cycles (– 80°C/37°C). Titres were 279 
determined via the TCID50 method; RAW 264.7 cells were seeded in 96-well plates, infected with 10-280 
fold serial dilutions of MuNoV, incubated for three days at 37 °C with 5% CO2, and finally stained with 281 
0.2% crystal violet for 30 minutes. Titres, expressed as TCID50/ml, were calculated according to the 282 
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Reed and Muench transformation [42]. MuNoV stocks with a titre range of 2.00×106 to 1.12×107 283 
TCID50/mL were subsequently used. 284 
 285 
Passive decontamination and multiple-cycle active decontamination of porcine respiratory 286 
coronavirus- or murine norovirus- inoculated surgical masks and filtering facepiece respirators 287 
Assays investigating time-dependent effects of virus degradation at room temperature (passive 288 
decontamination), were performed using new SMs or FFRs. Per time point (0 hour, 1 day, 2 days, 3 289 
days, 4 days, 5 days, 7 days, 14 days, and 21 days) and per virus (PRCV or MuNoV), one SM or FFR 290 
was inoculated. The workflow followed previously described protocols for SM and FFR inoculation and 291 
virus elution [31,33]. Briefly, per SM or FFR, 100 µl of undiluted viral suspension were injected under 292 
the first outer layer at the centre of each of three square coupons (34 mm x 34 mm) previously outlined 293 
in graphite pencil on the intact SMs or FFRs. In addition to inoculation of the de facto SMs or FFRs, 294 
100 µl of viral suspension were pipetted onto both elastic straps. SMs and FFRs thus inoculated were 295 
allowed to dry for 20 minutes at room temperature in a class II biological safety cabinet and were then 296 
incubated in the dark (to limit any effect light might have on viral decay) at laboratory room temperature 297 
(average 20°C) for the specified time points. 298 
 299 
Assays investigating cumulative effects of multiple-cycle VHP and UVGI on SM or FFR 300 
decontamination (active decontamination), consisted of either one or four decontamination cycles 301 
applied prior to PRCV or MuNoV inoculation and subsequent decontamination, thus resulting in an 302 
overall total of two and five decontaminations per SM or FFR. Since cumulative DH treatments were 303 
found to significantly alter the characteristics of FFRs when exceeding three decontamination cycles 304 
(see below), assays investigating cumulative effects of multiple-cycle DH decontamination, consisted 305 
of either one or two FFR decontamination cycles applied prior to PRCV or MuNoV inoculation and 306 
subsequent decontamination, resulting in a maximum number of three DH decontaminations. Per 307 
decontamination method and type of face covering within the respective assays, one negative control 308 
SM or FFR (uncontaminated but treated), three treated SMs or FFRs (PRCV- or MuNoV-contaminated 309 
and treated), and three positive controls (PRCV- or MuNoV-contaminated but untreated) were utilised. 310 
Per treated or control SM or FFR, 100 µl of undiluted viral suspension were injected under the first outer 311 
layer at the centre of each of three square coupons. In addition to inoculation of the de facto SMs or 312 
FFRs, 100 µl of viral suspension were pipetted onto one elastic strap per contaminated SM or FFR.  SMs 313 
and FFRs were allowed to dry for 20 minutes at room temperature in a class II biological safety cabinet 314 
before final decontamination via UVGI, VHP, or DH.  315 
 316 
Upon completion of the different decontamination protocols, PRCV or MuNoV was eluted from three 317 
excised coupons and one severed elastic strap per SM or FFR (in the case of passive decontamination 318 
assays both straps) via maximum speed vortex (2500 revolutions per minute in a VWR VX-2500 Multi-319 
  10 
Tube Vortexer; 1 minute- or 20 minute vortex for PRCV- and MuNoV inoculated SMs or FFRs, 320 
respectively) into 4 mL elution medium consisting of MEM or DMEM (Sigma)) supplemented with 2 321 
% of an association of penicillin (5000 SI units/mL) and streptomycin (5 mg/mL) (PS, Sigma); for 322 
elution from VHP-treated SMs or FFRs, 20% FCS and 0.1% β-mercaptoethanol were added to the 323 
medium. Titres of infectious PRCV or MuNoV recovered from individual coupons and straps were 324 
determined via TCID50 assay. Back titrations of inoculum stocks were performed in parallel to each 325 
series of decontamination experiments.  326 
 327 
Data analysis and statistics 328 
Statistical analyses of differences in infectious viral titres were performed using GraphPad Prism 7 329 
(Graph-Pad Software) and P-values were computed by using a two-sided independent sample t-test, 330 
where ****P<0.0001, ***P<0.001, **P<0.01, *P<0.05, and ns is P≥0.05. 331 
 
  11 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 332 
 333 
Infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus is recovered up to five and seven days after inoculation 334 
of SMs and FFRs; murine norovirus remains detectable after seven days of passive SM or FFR 335 
decontamination.   336 
To combat PPE shortages provoked by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, repeated re-use of both SMs and 337 
FFRs has been recommended [1,2,7,8].[1,2,7,8](1,2,7,8)(1,2,7,8)(1,2,7,8) Prior decontamination of 338 
SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory or oral human pathogens is paramount to SM or FFR safe re-use 339 
and may be achieved either passively via storage of items or via active SM and FFR reprocessing.  340 
 341 
To validate CDC-issued limited re-use recommendations for passive decontamination by storage [10], 342 
we evaluated time-dependent persistence of PRCV, an infectious SARS-CoV-2 surrogate, and MuNoV, 343 
a notoriously tenacious small non-enveloped oral pathogen, on SMs and FFRs. Infectious PRCV was 344 
detectable for up to five days post inoculation on SM coupons (1.52 (±0.38) log10 TCID50/mL) and three 345 
days post inoculation on SM straps (0.88 (±0.11) log10 TCID50/mL). The recovery of  PRCV from FFRs 346 
was similar to that of SMs, with coupon virus levels near the assay LOD between days three and five 347 
post inoculation and 1.04 (±0.42) log10 TCID50/mL detected at day seven post inoculation; no infectious 348 
PRCV was recovered from straps past day one post inoculation (Figure 2). Infectious MuNoV remained 349 
detectable after seven days of passive SM or FFR coupon decontamination (1.88 (±0.38) and 0.97 350 
(±0.14) log10 TCID50/mL, respectively) and was also elutable from SM and FFR straps at this time (1.43 351 
(±0.53) and 1.18 (±0.18) log10 TCID50/mL, respectively) (Figure 3). 352 
 353 
--- 354 
Figure 2. Recovery of porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) after elution from filtering facepiece 355 
respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) kept at room temperature (20°C) over time. PRCV 356 
infectivity was analysed in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 357 
log10 TCID50/mL (6.31×100 TCID50/mL). 358 
--- 359 
Figure 3. Recovery of murine norovirus (MuNoV) after elution from filtering facepiece respirators 360 
(FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) kept at room temperature (20°C) over time. MuNoV infectivity was 361 
analysed in RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL 362 
(6.31×100 TCID50/mL).  363 
--- 364 
 365 
We confirm passive room temperature SM and FFR decontamination to be effective for both PRCV and 366 
MuNoV inactivation. However, we show that CDC-issued recommendations of a five-day room 367 
temperature storage [10] may be too short as they do not allow for total degradation of high virus loads 368 
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on all SM and FFR materials (this in line with recent observations on other PPE items [13,14]). 369 
According to our observations, the storage period should ideally be extended to at least seven days for 370 
safe coronavirus inactivation and to a minimum of 14 days for decontamination of non-enveloped 371 
viruses such as noroviruses.  372 
 373 
Up to five cycles of active VHP and UVGI decontamination do not visually affect SMs or FFRs; 374 
up to five and up to three DH cycles do not affect the physical appearance of SMs and FFRs, 375 
respectively. 376 
In high-throughput environments that necessitate a ready PPE availability (hospitals, nursing homes, 377 
and other public facilities), an extended storage and turnaround time of one or even two weeks may not 378 
be feasible, necessitating the implementation of fast-acting active decontamination techniques. Active 379 
decontamination must guarantee not only the inactivation of SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens, but 380 
must do so without compromising the integrity of the SMs or FFRs themselves. Decontaminating 381 
treatments are known to have inherently detrimental side effects that may compromise the integrity of 382 
decontaminated objects [43]; while VHP, UVGI, and DH decontamination have previously been shown 383 
to not significantly impact performance of polypropylene-based SMs or FFRs following single cycle 384 
decontamination [17–19,21], the maximum number of decontamination cycles may be limited [43]. To 385 
validate repeated safe reuse of SMs and FFRs, we investigated SM integrity subsequent to one and five, 386 
and FFR integrity subsequent to one, two, and five cycles of VHP, UVGI, and DH decontamination.  387 
 388 
Visual appearance of SMs and FFRs following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination 389 
After one VHP, UVGI or DH decontamination cycle, no abnormalities were registered at visual SM or 390 
FFR inspection. After multiple decontamination cycles VHP- or UVGI- treated SMs and FFRs remained 391 
physically unaffected, this in line with previous studies [44,45]. Only FFRs subjected to five cycles of 392 
DH showed signs of degradation or burning which manifested as brown discoloration of FFR elastic 393 
straps and disassociation of the metal noseband from FFR fabrics; as a consequence, five cycles of DH 394 
treatment were abandoned in further analyses and were, uniquely for DH, replaced by tests performed 395 
after three treatment cycles. 396 
 397 
Single and multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH decontamination do not adversely affect SM 398 
BFE. Single- and multiple UVGI decontamination does not adversely affect FFR NaCl filtration 399 
efficiency, while VHP and DH treatments induce a slight decrease in filtration efficiency after one 400 
or three decontamination cycles. 401 
 402 
SM BFE following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination 403 
To investigate whether one and five and one, two, and five (three for DH) cycles of decontamination 404 
affect SM and FFR integrity, respectively, SM BFE testing was performed according to EN14683 and 405 
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FFR filtration efficiency was investigated using the sub-micron NaCl aerosol method (NIOSH 42 CFR 406 
Part 84). Both SMs and FFRs surpassed minimum filtration efficiency requirements before (99.50% 407 
(±0.08) BFE and 97.01% (±0.56) NaCl filtration efficiency) decontamination. SM BFE remained 408 
consistently higher than 98% after single- and multiple-cycle decontamination (Figure 4 A).  409 
 410 
FFR NaCl filtration efficiency following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination 411 
FFR filtration efficiencies remained above the required ≥95% (i.e. <5% penetration) following DH and 412 
UVGI single-cycle treatments, however dropped to 91.02% (±8.38) post VHP exposure (this owing to 413 
the aberrant value of 79.2% for a single FFR). Following two, three (for DH), or five decontamination 414 
cycles, filtration efficiency of UVGI- and VHP-treated FFRs remained above 95%, but dropped to 415 
94.16% (±1.02) after three cycles of DH decontamination (Figure 4 B). VHP (which is FDA-authorised 416 
for FFR decontamination) is typically not destructive to polypropylene FFRs [8,22] and has previously 417 
been shown to not negatively affect FFR performance after single or multiple decontamination cycles 418 
in assays similar to ours [44,46].  Since neither two nor five cycles of decontamination caused a drop in 419 
filtration efficiency, it seems likely that the single aberrant result after one VHP cycle may have been 420 
due to an issue with the item itself rather than the decontamination. It follows that all three methods are 421 
suitable for single-cycle FFR decontamination and reuse and that UVGI- and VHP decontamination 422 
may safely be applied to FFRs for up to five cycles. DH at 102°C should only be used for a maximum 423 
of three iterations; for more than three DH decontamination cycles, only temperatures that preserve the 424 
filtration characteristics of pristine FFRs (< 100°C) are to be recommended [18,46].  425 
 426 
--- 427 
Figure 4. Filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) NaCl filtration efficiency- and surgical mask (SM) 428 
bacterial filtration efficiency (BFE) testing after single-cycle or multiple-cycle decontamination using 429 
dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). 430 
Horizontal dashed lines represent the NaCl filtration efficiency requirement of  ≥95% according to 431 
NIOSH 42 CFR Part 84. Untreated FFRs (n=3) surpassed the minimum NaCl filtration efficiency, 432 
achieving 97.01% (±0.56) as a baseline before treatment. Horizontal dotted lines represent the bacterial 433 
filtration efficiency (3 µm droplet size) requirement of  ≥98% according to EN 14683 for Type II and 434 
ASTM F2100 for Level 2 SMs. Untreated SMs (n=3) surpassed the minimum BFE, achieving 99.50% 435 
(±0.08) as a baseline before treatment. 436 
--- 437 
 438 
Multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH decontamination decrease airflow resistance of SMs but 439 
do not adversely affect FFR breathability. 440 
Breathability, or resistance to airflow during inhalation and exhalation, is an indication of the difficulty 441 
in breathing through SMs or FFRs and as such is important to wearer comfort. Breathability of SMs was 442 
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measured via differential pressure (pressure drop) test according to EN 14683 + AC:2019 [38], while 443 
breathability of FFRs was assessed by inhalation and exhalation resistance tests according to NIOSH 444 
Standard Test Procedures (TEB-APR-STP-0007 and TEB-APR-STP-0003). 445 
 446 
SM breathability following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination 447 
Untreated SMs (n=5) reached 52.08 (±0.99) Pa/cm2 differential pressure before treatment, while 448 
differential pressures were only slightly elevated following single-cycle DH (54.88 (±3.00) Pa/cm2) and 449 
VHP (59.2 (±3.88) Pa/cm2) decontamination, but exceeded the limit of 60 Pa/cm2 post UVGI treatment 450 
with a measurement of 63.72 (±7.05) Pa/cm2 (Figure 5). Following five decontamination cycles, 451 
pressure drop test results consistently exceeded the prescribed maximum of 60 Pa/cm2 (Figure 5), with 452 
mean values of 66.82 (±2.88) Pa/cm2 (DH), 69.04 (±3.88) Pa/cm2 (VHP) and 59.78 (±1.47) Pa/cm2 453 
(UVGI). Such elevated results should exclude the tested SMs from use following multiple-cycle 454 
decontamination via all three methods according to EN 14683 + AC:2019; however, it should be noted 455 
that mean differential pressure results have been shown to vary depending on the SM type analysed [46]. 456 
Hence, values exceeding the 60 Pa/cm2 limit in this study may have been artificially elevated by high 457 
SM baseline values prior to decontamination rather than the decontamination proceedures themselves, 458 
which have, in other studies, been shown to retain high SM performance even after multiple treatment 459 
cycles [46,47]. In Belgium, where SMs may be marketed and used in the Covid-19 crisis situation 460 
according to an “Alternative Test Protocol” issued by the Belgian Federal Agency for Medicines and 461 
Health Products  that sets the maximum differential pressure limit at ≤ 70 Pa/cm2 [48], all treated SMs 462 
met current breathability requirements.  463 
 464 
--- 465 
Figure 5. Surgical mask (SM) breathability testing after single-cycle or multiple-cycle decontamination 466 
using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal irradiation 467 
(UVGI). Horizontal dotted lines represent the maximum allowed differential pressure in following 468 
standards: <40 Pa/cm2 according to EN 14683:2019 Annex C for Type I and II masks and < 60 Pa/cm2 469 
for Type IIR. Untreated SMs (n=5) achieved 52.08 (±0.99) Pa/cm2 differential pressure as a baseline 470 
before treatment.  471 
--- 472 
FFR breathability following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination 473 
FFR inhalation and exhalation resistance measurements remained far below the recommended 474 
maximum limits of ≤35 mmH2O in inhalation and ≤25 mmH2O in exhalation maintaining acceptable 475 
respirability according to applicable standards and regulations both before (inhalation: 12.43 (±0.69) 476 
mmH2O; exhalation: 11.9 (±0.86) mmH2O) and after single or multiple decontamination cycles (Figure 477 
6), echoing other published results [46,49]. 478 
 479 
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--- 480 
Figure 6. Filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) breathability testing after single-cycle or multiple-cycle 481 
decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal 482 
irradiation (UVGI). Exhalation (A) and inhalation (B) breathing resistances after decontamination. 483 
Horizontal dashed (above) and dotted (below) lines represent the following breathing resistance 484 
standards: Exhalation: ≤25 mmH2O and Inhalation: ≤35 mmH2O for FFRs according to NIOSH 42 CFR 485 
Part 84. Untreated FFRs (n=5) achieved inhalation and exhalation resistance of 12.43 (±0.69) mmH2O 486 
and 11.9 (±0.86) mmH2O, respectively. 487 
--- 488 
 489 
A limitation of this work pertains to the fact that filtration efficiency and breathability assays may not 490 
be directly clinically applicable and should ideally be evaluated in a real-use context where SM or FFR 491 
fit to face impacts measurements.  While comparative fitted filtration efficiencies (FFEs), combining 492 
intrinsic filtering efficiency of materials and efficacy of fit to face recently showed unchanged fitted 493 
filtration efficiencies of more than 95% for sterilised FFRs, SMs were shown to have relatively lower 494 
FFEs [50].  495 
 496 
Infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus is recovered at high titres from positive control SM- 497 
and FFR coupons, at lower titres from straps, and remains under the limit of detection following 498 
two (VHP, UVGI, DH), three (DH-treated FFRs) or five (VHP, UVGI, DH (SM)) active 499 
decontamination cycles.  500 
 501 
 PRCV recovery from SM and FFR positive controls 502 
Back titrations of virus inoculums performed in parallel to each series of experiments confirmed PRCV 503 
inoculum titres to be within a range of 7.30 to 8.30 log10 TCID50/mL for all experiments. The cell culture 504 
limit of detection (LOD) was 0.8 log10 TCID50/mL for all assays. An initially observed VHP cytotoxicity 505 
and correspondingly elevated LOD of 1.80 log10 TCID50/mL of VHP-treated coupon eluates was 506 
corrected via β-mercaptoethanol and FCS supplementation of elution medium; elevated cytotoxicity of 507 
VHP-treated strap eluates (SM and FFR) could not be neutralised and remained at 1.80 log10 TCID50/mL. 508 
Values below the LOD were thus considered as ≤0.80 log10 TCID50/mL or ≤1.80 log10 TCID50/mL (VH-509 
treated straps). Comparable high levels of infectious virus were recovered from once-, twice- (DH-510 
treated FFRs) or four-times treated, PRCV-inoculated left, right and middle coupons of all SMs and 511 
FFRs within a range of 4.27 (±0.50) to 6.07 (±0.29) log10 TCID50/mL (Supplementary Figure 1). 512 
Recovery values for infectious PCRV from SM and FFR straps were also similar between experiments, 513 
however they were lower than coupon recovery values, with mean values ranging from below the LOD 514 
to 4.44 (±0.74) log10 TCID50/mL (Supplementary Figure 1). 515 
 516 
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Multiple cycle decontamination of PRCV-inoculated SMs  517 
Following two cycles of SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all PRCV titres remained below 518 
the respective LOD of the assay (with the exception of UVGI treated straps), showing a total loss of 519 
infectivity of more than five orders of magnitude for UVGI-treated coupons (5.05 log10 reduction) and 520 
four orders of magnitude for VHP- and DH-treated coupons (4.83 and 4.39 log10 reduction, respectively), 521 
this in line with previous publications [49,51]. Titres of PRCV recovered from SM straps following two 522 
treatment cycles were reduced by over two orders of magnitude post UVGI, VHP and DH treatment of 523 
SM straps (2.48, 2.22 and 2.85 log10 reduction) (Figure 7).  524 
 525 
--- 526 
Figure 7. Porcine coronavirus (PRCV) inactivation following multiple cycle surgical mask (SM) 527 
decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal 528 
irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case of DH) 529 
decontamination treatments on PRCV-inoculated SM coupons and straps. PRCV infectivity was 530 
analysed in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL 531 
(6.31×100 TCID50/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM straps (1.80 log10 532 
TCID50/mL (6.31×101 TCID50/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated, 533 
decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in 534 
parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log10 535 
TCID50/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-536 




Following five cycles of  SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all PRCV titres remained below 541 
the respective LOD of the assay (with the exception of UVGI treated straps), showing a total loss of 542 
infectivity of more than five orders of magnitude for UVGI-treated coupons (5.37 log10 reduction) and 543 
more than four orders of magnitude for VHP- and DH-treated coupons (4.64 and 4.69 log10 reduction, 544 
respectively); titres of PRCV recovered from treated SM straps were reduced by over one order of 545 
magnitude post UVGI (1.59 log10 reduction) and for VHP-treated straps (2.02 log10 reduction), and by 546 
almost four orders of magnitude for DH- treated straps (3.94 log10 reduction) (Figure 7).  547 
 548 
Multiple cycle decontamination of PRCV-inoculated FFRs  549 
Decontamination treatment effects followed a similar pattern of PRCV inactivation for FFR coupons 550 
decontaminated twice via DH, VHP, and UVGI reducing viral titres by more than three and four orders 551 
of magnitude (3.71, 4.45 and 4.62 log10 reduction, respectively), supporting previous observations [31]. 552 
The impact of two-cycle decontamination could not be measured for DH-treated FFR straps due to 553 
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insufficient recovery of infectious virus in the corresponding controls. Virus recovery from both SM 554 
and FFR straps has been shown to be highly variable both in our hands [31] and in those of others [52] 555 
(and indeed, probably for this reason, strap decontamination is rarely assessed). Without enough proof 556 
of inactivation, we cannot recommend safe decontamination of SM or FFR straps and suggest treating 557 
straps separately using a disinfecting wipe or similar approach. Two-cycle UVGI and VHP treatment of 558 
FFR straps resulted in a reduction of infectious PRCV loads by 1.46 and 0.63 log10 reduction, 559 
respectively (Figure 8). 560 
 561 
--- 562 
Figure 8. Porcine coronavirus (PRCV) inactivation following multiple cycle filtering facepiece 563 
respirator (FFR) decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and 564 
ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case 565 
of DH) decontamination treatments on PRCV-inoculated FFR coupons and straps. PRCV infectivity 566 
was analysed in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 567 
TCID50/mL (6.31×100 TCID50/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated FFR straps 568 
(1.80 log10 TCID50/mL (6.31×101 TCID50/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated, 569 
decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in 570 
parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log10 571 
TCID50/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-572 




Following five cycles of FFR UVGI, VHP, and DH, all PRCV titres remained below the respective LOD 577 
of the assay, reducing viral titres by over four orders of magnitude (4.48, 4.22 and 4.30 log10 reduction, 578 
respectively).  These results are in line with our own and others’ prior publications regarding 579 
decontamination of SARS-CoV-2- or surrogate-contaminated FFRs [31,51] and confirm that all three 580 
methods yield rapid and efficient virus inactivation even after multiple-cycle FFR decontamination. The 581 
impact of decontamination could not be measured for DH-treated FFR straps due to insufficient recovery 582 
of infectious virus in the corresponding controls. UVGI and VHP treatment of FFR straps resulted in a 583 
reduction of infectious PRCV loads by 1.81 and 0.18 log10 reduction, respectively (Figure 8).  584 
 585 
Infectious murine norovirus is recovered at high titres from positive control SM- and FFR 586 
coupons, at lower titres from straps, and remains under the limit of detection following two 587 
(VHP, UVGI, DH), three (DH) or five (VHP, UVGI) decontamination cycles.  588 
 589 
MuNoV recovery from SM and FFR positive controls 590 
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Back titrations of virus inoculums performed in parallel to each series of experiments confirmed MuNoV 591 
inoculum titres to be within a range of 6.30 to 7.05 log10 TCID50/mL for all experiments. The cell culture 592 
limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL for all assays except for those concerning VHP-593 
treated SM- or FFR straps and UVGI-treated FFR straps (1.80 log10 TCID50/mL). Comparable high 594 
levels of infectious virus were recovered from once-, twice- (DH-treated FFRs) or four-times treated , 595 
MuNoV-inoculated left, right and middle coupons of all SMs and FFRs within a range of 4.55 (±0.60) 596 
to 5.38 (±0.25) log10 TCID50/mL (Supplementary Figure 2). Recovery values for infectious MuNoV 597 
from SM and FFR straps were also similar between experiments, however they were lower than coupon 598 
recovery values, with mean values ranging from 1.80 (VHP LOD)  to 5.22 (±0.14) log10 TCID50/mL 599 
(Supplementary Figure 2). 600 
 601 
Multiple cycle decontamination of MuNoV-inoculated SMs  602 
Following two cycles of SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all MuNoV titres remained below 603 
the respective LOD of the assay, showing total loss of infectivity of over four orders of magnitude for 604 
UVGI-, VHP- and DH-treated SM coupons (4.47, 4.33, and 4.15 log10 reduction, respectively). Titres 605 
of MuNoV recovered from treated SM straps were reduced by less than three orders of magnitude post 606 
two cycles of UVGI and VHP treatment (0.96 and  2.55 (below the LOD) log10 reduction, respectively) 607 
and by over four orders of magnitude post two-cycle-DH treatment (4.43 log10 reduction (below LOD)) 608 
(Figure 9). 609 
 610 
--- 611 
Figure 9. Murine norovirus (MuNoV) inactivation following multiple cycle surgical mask (SM) 612 
decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal 613 
irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case of DH) 614 
decontamination treatments on MuNoV-inoculated SM coupons and straps. MuNoV infectivity was 615 
analysed in RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL 616 
(6.31×100 TCID50/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM straps (1.80 log10 617 
TCID50/mL (6.31×101 TCID50/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated, 618 
decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in 619 
parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log10 620 
TCID50/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-621 




Following five cycles of  SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all MuNoV titres remained 626 
below the respective LOD of the assay, showing total loss of infectivity of over four orders of magnitude 627 
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for UVGI and DH-treated coupons (4.65 and 4.29 log10 reduction, respectively), while titres of MuNoV 628 
recovered from VHP-treated coupons showed a loss of infectivity of almost four orders of magnitude 629 
(3.96 log10 reduction). Titres of MuNoV recovered from treated SM straps were reduced by 0.88, 2.39 630 
(below the LOD), and 3.84 log10, respectively, post UVGI, VHP- and DH-treatment (Figure 9).  631 
 632 
Multiple cycle decontamination of MuNoV-inoculated FFRs 633 
Decontamination followed a similar pattern of MuNoV inactivation for FFR coupons decontaminated 634 
twice via DH, reducing viral titres by over three orders of magnitude (3.96 log10 reduction), and by over 635 
four orders of magnitude for VHP- and UVGI-treated FFR coupons (4.42, and 4.44 log10 reduction, 636 
respectively). UVGI- and DH-treatment of FFR straps reduced infectivity by 0.06 log10 (not significant), 637 
and 3.15 log10 (from 3.63 (±0.76) log10 TCID50/mL to below the LOD), respectively. Loss of infectivity 638 
could not be demonstrated subsequent to MuNoV elution from twice-VHP-treated FFR straps owing to 639 
poor virus recovery (Figure 10).  640 
 641 
--- 642 
Figure 10. Murine norovirus (MuNoV) inactivation following multiple cycle filtering facepiece 643 
respirator (FFR) decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and 644 
ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case 645 
of DH) decontamination treatments on MuNoV- inoculated FFR coupons and straps. MuNoV infectivity 646 
was analysed in RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL 647 
(6.31×100 TCID50/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP- and UVGI-treated FFR straps 648 
(1.80 log10 TCID50/mL (6.31×101 TCID50/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated, 649 
decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in 650 
parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log10 651 
TCID50/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-652 




Decontamination followed a similar pattern of MuNoV inactivation on FFR coupons after five iterations 657 
of UVGI, VHP, and DH treatments, reducing viral titres by over four orders of magnitude for UVGI- 658 
and DH-treated coupons (4.33 and 4.22 log10 reduction, respectively), and by less than three orders of 659 
magnitude for VHP-treated FFR coupons (2.84 log10 reduction).  UVGI and DH-treatment of FFR straps 660 
reduced infectivity by less than one and over three orders of magnitude (0.65 (not significant) and 3.10 661 
(not significant) log10 reduction, respectively); Loss of infectivity could not be demonstrated subsequent 662 
to MuNoV elution from VHP-treated FFR straps after five decontamination cycles owing to poor virus 663 
recovery (Figure 10). 664 
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 665 
CONCLUSION 666 
In conclusion, we showed that PRCV and MuNoV remain detectable on SMs and FFRs for up to five 667 
and seven days of passive decontamination at room temperature, necessitating either longer 668 
decontamination periods than currently recommended by the CDC or active decontamination techniques 669 
that can decontaminate PPE within a matter of hours. Three such active decontamination techniques 670 
were evaluated in this study with respect to their effect both on SM and FFR integrity and on the 671 
inactivation of the enveloped SARS-CoV-2 surrogate PRCV and non-enveloped human norovirus 672 
surrogate MuNoV. Single and multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH were shown to not adversely 673 
affect bacterial filtration efficiency of SMs. Single- and multiple UVGI did not adversely affect FFR 674 
filtration efficiency, while VHP and DH induced a slight decrease in FFR filtration efficiency after one 675 
or three decontamination cycles. Multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH decreased airflow resistance 676 
of SMs but did not adversely affect FFR breathability. All three active decontamination methods 677 
efficiently inactivated both viruses after five decontamination cycles, permitting demonstration of a loss 678 
of infectivity by more than three orders of magnitude. This multi-disciplinal, consolidated approach, 679 
wherein both SM and FFR integrity and the inactivation of a coronavirus and a hardier non-enveloped 680 
norovirus are investigated subsequent to multiple decontamination cycles thus provides important 681 
information on how often a given PPE item may be safely reused. The knowledge gained here will help 682 
close the existing gap between supply and demand and provide a multi-facetted measure of security to 683 
health-care personnel and the general public both during the Covid-19 pandemic and beyond, when 684 
established protocols for re-use of single-use only items may be upheld for environmental reasons.  685 
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE CAPTIONS  843 
 844 
Supplementary Figure 1. Recovery of porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) after elution from 845 
filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) decontaminated either once or four 846 
times (twice in the case of DH assays) prior to virus inoculation. Infectious PRCV recovery was analysed 847 
in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL (6.31×100 848 
TCID50/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM or FFR straps (1.80 log10 849 
TCID50/mL (6.31×101 TCID50/mL)). Similar levels of virus recovery were detected for left, right and 850 
middle (L, R, M) (n=3) coupons of FFRs and SMs; recovery efficacy of infectious virus from straps (S) 851 
(n=3) deviated significantly in all analyses from the mean of all coupons and remained below the LOD 852 
for assays performed on DH-treated FFR straps. Mean log10 TCID50/mL and standard errors of the 853 
means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-sided independent sample t-test to 854 
calculate differences between individual coupon values and differences between mean values of all 855 
coupons and straps, where ****P<0.0001, ***P<0.001, **P<0.01, *P<0.05, and ns.  856 
 857 
Supplementary Figure 2. Recovery of murine norovirus (MuNoV) after elution from filtering 858 
facepiece respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) decontaminated either once or four times (twice 859 
in the case of DH assays) prior to virus inoculation. Infectious MuNoV recovery was analysed in 860 
RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log10 TCID50/mL (6.31×100 861 
TCID50/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM- or FFR straps and UVGI-treated 862 
FFR straps (1.80 log10 TCID50/mL ((6.31×101 TCID50/mL)). Similar levels of virus recovery were 863 
detected for left, right and middle (L, R, M) (n=3) coupons of FFRs and SMs; recovery efficacy of 864 
infectious virus from straps (S) (n=3) deviated significantly in all analyses from the mean of all coupons 865 
(except from DH-treated straps). Mean log10 TCID50/mL and standard errors of the means are 866 
represented. P-values were computed by using a two-sided independent sample t-test to calculate 867 
differences between individual coupon values and differences between mean values of all coupons and 868 
straps, where ****P<0.0001, ***P<0.001, **P<0.01, *P<0.05, and ns. 869 
